

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5402
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 01531

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E.O. 11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: US PLENARY STATEMENT,
FEBRUARY 1, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO.110

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
PAUL WARNKE, U.S. DELEGATION, AT PLENARY FEBRUARY 1:

BEGIN TEXT: AT OUR LAST PLENARY MEETING, I STATED THAT, IN
PREPARATION FOR THE CURRENT ROUND OF TRILATERAL TALKS,
MY GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ITS POSITIONS
ON VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND ADOPTED
SUBSTANTIALLY REVISED APPROACHES TO A NUMBER OF KEY
VERIFICATION ISSUES. AT THAT SAME MEETING, I DESCRIBED
A MAJOR CHANGE IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ONE OF THOSE
ISSUES -- THE QUESTION OF HOW ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WOULD BE
INITIATED.

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TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE MY DELEGATION'S GENERAL
APPROACH TO TWO OTHER PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF OUR NEW
VERIFICATION PACKAGE -- THE QUESTIONS OF INTERNAL SEISMIC
INSTALLATIONS AND OF PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS ONCE AN INSPECTION REQUEST HAS BEEN ACCEPTED.
BOTH OF THESE COMPONENTS WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE
SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SUPPLEMENT THE

MULTILATERAL TREATY. MY DELEGATION PLANS TO PRESENT OUR DETAILED VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS IN THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP, WHERE WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE PROMPTLY TO WORK OUT THE CONTENTS OF THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

IN THE COURSE OF OUR DECEMBER MEETINGS, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION DESCRIBED ITS CONCEPT FOR AUTHENTICATING SEISMIC DATA AND FOR DESIGN OF AN INTERNAL SEISMIC STATION. WE ALSO INDICATED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER VARIOUS MODES OF OPERATING THE STATIONS. WHILE THE SOVIET SIDE SHOWED INTEREST IN OUR PRESENTATIONS, WE TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF DR. MOROKHOV'S CONCERN, EXPRESSED TOWARD THE END OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, THAT OUR CONCEPT MIGHT INVOLVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ELEMENTS AS THE OLD IDEA OF "BLACK BOXES." IN THE INTERVAL SINCE THEN, WE HAVE MADE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO RESPOND TO THAT CONCERN.

OUR REVISED APPROACH IS BASED ON TWO DIFFERING, BUT I BELIEVE FULLY COMPATIBLE, SETS OF CONSIDERATIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, IT IS DESIGNED SO AS NOT TO INTRUDE ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PARTICIPANTS; IT IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE INSTALLATIONS WILL NOT BE MISUSED FOR UNAUTHORIZED PURPOSES; AND IT PROVIDES THAT THE NECESSARY FORMS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PARTICIPANTS WILL BE CARRIED OUT ON A COOPERATIVE RATHER THAN CONFRONTATIONAL BASIS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE
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OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVE OF INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY. IT MUST THEREFORE MEET CERTAIN TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE USE OF HIGH QUALITY INSTRUMENTATION THAT IS APPROPRIATELY LOCATED AND CAPABLE OF PROVIDING AUTHENTICATED DATA ON A PROMPT AND RELIABLE BASIS.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THESE VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS CAN BE RECONCILED THROUGH THE USE OF SPECIALLY EQUIPPED SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS THAT WOULD BE NATIONALLY OWNED AND OPERATED, AND WOULD FUNCTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CERTAIN AGREED PROCEDURES INTENDED TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE IN THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE DATA. IN PRACTICE, THE APPROACH WOULD WORK IN THE FOLLOWING WAY.

-- THE GENERAL AREAS IN WHICH INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE LOCATED WOULD BE ESTABLISHED DURING OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRECISE LOCATION OF EACH INSTALLATION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED THROUGH A COOPERATIVE SITE SELECTION PROCEDURE WHICH WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT. WHERE CONDITIONS ARE SUITABLE, THE INSTALLATIONS COULD BE LOCATED AT OR IN THE VICINITY OF EXISTING NATIONAL STATIONS.

-- THE HOST PARTY WOULD CARRY OUT THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE SEISMIC INSTALLATION, BOTH OF THE SURFACE FACILITY AND

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OF THE HOLE FOR THE DOWN-HOLE EQUIPMENT.

-- THE EQUIPMENT USED AT THE INSTALLATIONS WOULD MEET
CERTAIN AGREED DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS. GIVEN THE NEED FOR
A RELIABLE SYSTEM AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF
OUR COUNTRIES, WE WOULD NATURALLY WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF ADVANCED, HIGH QUALITY EQUIPMENT. THE HOST PARTY WOULD
BE FREE TO OBTAIN THE EQUIPMENT FROM ANY AVAILABLE SOURCE,
PROVIDED IT MET THE AGREED TECHNICAL STANDARDS.

-- INSTALLATION OF THE SEISMIC EQUIPMENT AT THE STATIONS
COULD BE PERFORMED INDEPENDENTLY BY THE HOST PARTY, WITH
THE SOLE EXCEPTION OF THE DOWN-HOLE PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD
BE INSTALLED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF PERSONNEL FROM THE
OTHER PARTY. PRIOR TO INSTALLATION, THE OTHER PARTY WOULD
HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE AUTHENTICATION
MODULE, WHICH WOULD BE PART OF THE DOWN-HOLE PACKAGE. THE
AGREEMENT WOULD SPECIFY PROCEDURES THAT WOULD ENSURE THAT
THE MODULE CONFORMED TO PREVIOUSLY AGREED STANDARDS. ONCE
THE DOWN-HOLE PACKAGE IS INSTALLED, ACCESS TO IT WOULD BE
LIMITED TO SITUATIONS, SUCH AS PERIODIC MAINTENANCE

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VISITS, IN WHICH PERSONNEL OF THE OTHER PARTY WOULD PARTICIPATE.

-- WHEN THE HOST PARTY COMPLETED THE INSTALLATION PROCESS, PERSONNEL FROM THE OTHER PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CHECKOUT OF THE STATION.

-- MAINTENANCE OF THE INSTALLATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED STANDARDS WOULD BE THE INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HOST PARTY, WITH THE SOLE EXCEPTION OF PERIODIC MAINTENANCE AND UNSCHEDULED EMERGENCY REPAIRS OF THE DOWN-HOLE PACKAGE, IN WHICH PERSONNEL FROM THE OTHER PARTY WOULD PARTICIPATE. HOWEVER, UNDER THE DESIGN CONCEPT THAT WE HAVE DESCRIBED, THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT REDUNDANCY IN THE DOWN-HOLE EQUIPMENT SO THAT MAINTENANCE SHOULD BE INFREQUENT, WITH PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND REPLACEMENT OF THE KEY-WORD MEMORY IN THE AUTHENTICATION EQUIPMENT PERFORMED PERHAPS ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.

-- AS FAR AS MANNING IS CONCERNED, THE HOST PARTY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT WHATEVER HUMAN ACTIVITIES ARE NEEDED AT THE STATIONS, APART FROM THE INFREQUENT SERVICING OF THE DOWN-HOLE PACKAGE. OF COURSE, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THERE IS A NEED FOR PERSONNEL AT THE STATIONS WOULD DEPEND ON THE DESIGN CONCEPT EMPLOYED. IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS THE LOCATION OF A SINGLE STATION IN A REMOTE AREA, THE HOST PARTY MIGHT PREFER TO USE A HIGHLY AUTOMATED DESIGN. IN THE CASE OF ARRAYS, THE COMPLEXITY OF THE INSTALLATION WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE MORE OR LESS CONTINUOUS HUMAN PRESENCE.

-- DATA WOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO THE PARTIES, INCLUDING THE HOST, IN A MANNER THAT MET CERTAIN AGREED TECHNICAL
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SPECIFICATIONS. WE BELIEVE THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS APPROACH, BOTH IN TERMS OF COST AND RELIABILITY, IS TO USE SATELLITE LINKS FOR DATA TRANSMISSION. DATA COLLECTED AT THE STATIONS WOULD BE RECEIVED DIRECTLY BY THE HOST PARTY, PERHAPS AT A NATIONAL DATA CENTER, AS WELL AS TRANSMITTED TO THE OTHER PARTY.

-- TO PROMOTE THE EFFECTIVE INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATION OF THE STATIONS, PERSONNEL FROM THE PARTICIPATING PARTIES COULD COOPERATE IN A JOINT FAMILIARIZATION PROGRAM.

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO TURN TO THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. IN MY GOVERNMENT'S INTERNAL REVIEW OF THIS QUESTION DURING OUR RECENT RECESS, WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S VIEW THAT THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION TEAMS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AT HAND. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE NOW DEVELOPED AN APPROACH THAT PROVIDES SUCH FLEXIBILITY, AND THEREFORE ASSURES THE HOST PARTY THAT IT WILL NOT HAVE TO SHOULDER AN INORDINATELY HEAVY INSPECTION BURDEN. AT THE SAME TIME, IT PROVIDES FOR EFFECTIVE ON-SITE PROCEDURES THAT SHOULD HELP RESOLVE ANY QUESTIONS THAT MAY ARISE ABOUT TREATY COMPLIANCE. THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THIS APPROACH ARE AS FOLLOWS.

-- THE AREA TO BE INSPECTED WILL VARY FROM CASE TO CASE, AND WILL BE DETERMINED ON AN AD HOC BASIS. AT THE TIME THAT A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION VISIT IS ACCEPTED, THE HOST PARTY AND THE OTHER PARTY WOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON THE PERIMETER OF THE INSPECTION AREA. WE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT CERTAIN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS WITHIN OUR COUNTRIES WOULD NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR INSPECTION. THEREFORE AT THE TIME THAT A REQUEST IS ACCEPTED, AGREEMENT COULD ALSO BE REACHED ON THE BOUNDARIES OF ANY SPECIFIC LOCATIONS WITHIN THE AGREED

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PERIMETER THAT WOULD BE EXCLUDED. OF COURSE, THE SIZE OF ANY SUCH EXCLUDED AREAS WOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO BE LARGE.

-- THE HOST PARTY WOULD HAVE EXTENSIVE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES DURING THE VISIT. IT WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ACCOMPANY PERSONNEL FROM THE OTHER PARTY IN CARRYING OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS AND TO RECEIVE COPIES OF ALL DATA OBTAINED BY THEM. AMONG ITS RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD BE TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INSPECTION TEAM.

-- FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH A TWO-TIER APPROACH TO THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL. THE FIRST TIER WOULD INVOLVE A SPECIFIED LIST OF TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT THAT WOULD BE AUTHORIZED WHENEVER AN INSPECTION REQUEST IS ACCEPTED. THE LIST WOULD INCLUDE TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT WELL-SUITED TO CARRYING OUT A COMPETENT SURVEY OF A RELATIVELY LIMITED AREA. THESE GUARANTEED RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WOULD FORM A BASIC COMMON DENOMINATOR APPLICABLE TO ALL INSPECTIONS.

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-- IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO EMPLOY TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT IN ADDITION TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE GUARANTEED LIST. THESE ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WOULD BE THE BASIS OF THE SECOND TIER. THE AGREEMENT COULD PROVIDE THAT SUPPLEMENTARY RIGHTS COULD BE REQUESTED DURING CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO AN INSPECTION REQUEST OR DURING THE INSPECTION ITSELF. FOR EXAMPLE, WE CAN ENVISAGE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE AN AERIAL SURVEY OF AN AGREED AREA, USING APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENTATION, WOULD BE OF VALUE. IN CASES WHERE REQUESTS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS ARE MADE, AGREEMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED, ON AN AD HOC BASIS.

-- SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE BUILT INTO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE INSPECTION PROCEDURES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE AGREEMENT WOULD SPECIFY DEFINITE LIMITS ON THE DURATION OF THE VISIT AND ON THE NUMBER OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, PROVISION WOULD BE MADE TO ENABLE THE PARTIES TO MODIFY THESE LIMITS THROUGH CONSULTATION AND AD HOC MUTUAL AGREEMENT.

THESE REMARKS ON INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS AND ON-SITE INSPECTION PROCEDURES TOUCH ON ONLY THE BASIC FEATURES OF MY DELEGATION'S REVISED THINKING ON THESE QUESTIONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO ELABORATING OUR POSITIONS IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP. HOWEVER, I HOPE IT IS APPARENT, FROM THE BROAD OUTLINES I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY, THAT WE HAVE MADE A GENUINE EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE THE VIEWS OF OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS ON MATTERS OF GREAT SENSITIVITY AND IMPORTANCE. WHAT WE HAVE COME UP WITH, AS

A RESULT, IS A PRACTICAL APPROACH THAT, IN OUR VIEW, DOES
JUSTICE TO BOTH THE PRINCIPLES OF HOST GOVERNMENT SOVER-
EIGNTY AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. END TEXT WARNKE
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